Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Training Course

Participants can map regulatory obligations to governance, policies and accountable roles.

• AML/CFT laws, regulations, supervisory guidance, and internal policy hierarchy
• Board accountability for financial-crime risk appetite and control oversight
• Three-lines model roles across business, compliance, risk, and internal audit
• Money laundering reporting officer responsibilities, authority, and independence
• Policy exceptions, approvals, expiries, and documented compensating controls
• Regulatory examinations, enforcement themes, and remediation evidence expectations

Participants can produce a documented inherent and residual AML/CFT risk assessment.

• Inherent-risk factors: customers, products, geographies, channels, and transactions
• Risk assessment scope, data sources, assumptions, limitations, and ownership
• Heat maps combining likelihood, impact, control effectiveness, and residual risk
• Customer segmentation using legal form, activity, geography, and delivery channel
• Control mapping links risk statements to preventive and detective measures
• Risk appetite thresholds trigger escalation, restriction, exit, or enhanced review

Participants can design customer due diligence procedures proportionate to risk.

• Customer identification requirements for individuals, entities, trusts, and partnerships
• Verification methods using reliable, independent documents, databases, and registries
• Purpose-and-nature profiling establishes expected account activity and source information
• Risk scoring models combine customer, geography, product, channel, and behaviour
• CDD refresh cycles based on risk rating and material trigger events
• Onboarding decision records document acceptance, conditions, restrictions, or rejection

Participants can identify, verify and document beneficial ownership for complex entities.

• Beneficial ownership thresholds, control tests, and senior-managing-official fallback rules
• Ownership charts trace direct, indirect, nominee, and cross-border holdings
• Trust structures identify settlors, trustees, protectors, beneficiaries, and controllers
• Corporate registries, constitutional documents, and shareholder records corroborate ownership
• Red flags include unexplained intermediaries, bearer instruments, and circular ownership
• Ownership discrepancies trigger clarification, enhanced due diligence, or escalation

Participants can apply enhanced due diligence to high-risk customers and relationships.

• Enhanced due diligence triggers from risk rating, geography, ownership, and behaviour
• Source-of-wealth analysis distinguishes accumulation history from transaction funding sources
• Source-of-funds evidence links specific assets, income, transactions, and account activity
• Senior management approval requirements for high-risk relationship acceptance
• Politically exposed persons: domestic, foreign, international-organisation, family, associates
• Ongoing enhanced monitoring documents review frequency, thresholds, and escalation triggers

Participants can evaluate screening results and manage sanctions-related escalation decisions.

• Sanctions regimes: United Nations, European Union, United States, and domestic lists
• Screening inputs include names, aliases, dates, addresses, identifiers, and ownership
• Fuzzy matching, transliteration, and phonetic logic create potential screening matches
• Match adjudication compares identifiers, ownership, control, and transaction context
• Sanctions ownership rules identify entities controlled by designated persons
• Adverse-media assessment separates credible allegations, legal findings, and irrelevant reports

Participants can specify risk-based transaction-monitoring scenarios and operating thresholds.

• Monitoring architecture combines rules, behavioural analytics, cases, and investigation queues
• Scenario inventory maps typologies to products, customer segments, and payment data
• Threshold calibration uses historical volumes, risk appetite, and alert-quality measures
• Peer-group analysis compares transactions against customers with similar risk profiles
• Scenario documentation defines logic, parameters, exclusions, owners, and review frequency
• Change governance records approvals, testing evidence, implementation, and post-change results

Participants can investigate monitoring alerts and reach documented disposition decisions.

• Alert triage assesses data quality, urgency, exposure, and plausible explanations
• Investigative plans define hypotheses, evidence requests, milestones, and escalation points
• Transaction-flow analysis identifies counterparties, funds movement, patterns, and anomalies
• Link analysis connects accounts, devices, addresses, entities, and beneficial owners
• Customer profile comparison tests activity against stated purpose and expected behaviour
• Case narratives distinguish verified facts, customer explanations, inferences, and unresolved issues

Participants can prepare clear, timely and evidence-based suspicious activity reports.

• Suspicion thresholds distinguish unusual activity from reportable money-laundering concerns
• Suspicious activity report narratives state who, what, when, where, why, and how
• Chronologies organise account opening, transactions, alerts, contacts, and decisions
• Supporting evidence includes transaction records, identification documents, and investigation notes
• Tipping-off restrictions govern customer communication after internal suspicion escalation
• Reporting deadlines, confidentiality, retention, and law-enforcement information requests

Participants can identify terrorist-financing indicators and escalate concerns appropriately.

• Terrorist financing differs from money laundering in source and use
• Small-value transfers, crowdfunding, and cash collections as potential indicators
• Non-profit organisation risk assessment considers purpose, geography, partners, and controls
• Foreign terrorist fighter indicators require careful evidence and context assessment
• Targeted financial sanctions screening supports asset-freeze and reporting obligations
• CTF investigations avoid unsupported assumptions based on nationality, religion, or ethnicity

Participants can identify trade-based money-laundering risks from trade and payment evidence.

• Trade-based money laundering methods: over-invoicing, under-invoicing, and multiple invoicing
• Document review compares invoices, bills of lading, contracts, and payment instructions
• Commodity pricing analysis identifies material variance from credible market benchmarks
• Unusual shipping routes, ports, counterparties, and goods indicate heightened risk
• Open-account trade requires monitoring beyond traditional documentary trade-finance controls
• Escalation records connect trade anomalies, customer profile, payment flows, and evidence

Participants can assess AML/CFT risks in correspondent and third-party relationships.

• Correspondent banking risk assessment considers respondent profile, jurisdiction, products, and controls
• Wolfsberg Correspondent Banking Due Diligence Questionnaire supports structured information gathering
• Nested relationships obscure underlying customer access through respondent institutions
• Payable-through accounts require controls over sub-account access and activity
• Third-party due diligence assesses ownership, capability, controls, and adverse information
• Contractual controls define audit rights, reporting duties, and termination triggers

Participants can assess AML/CFT controls for virtual assets and digital payment products.

• Virtual-asset service provider risks include anonymity, speed, and cross-border reach
• FATF travel rule requirements govern originator and beneficiary information transfers
• Blockchain analytics identifies wallet exposure, transaction paths, and illicit-service interactions
• Unhosted wallet risk assessment considers ownership evidence and transaction behaviour
• Payment fintech controls address merchant aggregation, instant payments, and remote onboarding
• Technology change assessments document new typologies, controls, testing, and approvals

Participants can connect fraud indicators to AML/CFT escalation and investigation processes.

• Fraud proceeds generate laundering risk through accounts, intermediaries, and asset purchases
• Account takeover indicators include credential changes, device anomalies, and rapid transfers
• Insider-threat reviews examine privileged access, override patterns, and unexplained conduct
• Mule-account typologies feature rapid pass-through, shared devices, and recruitment patterns
• Fraud and AML case teams share evidence while maintaining reporting confidentiality
• Root-cause analysis distinguishes control failure, policy breach, system gap, and misconduct

Participants can define AML/CFT recordkeeping, data-quality and management-information requirements.

• Record-retention schedules cover customer files, transactions, investigations, and reports
• Data lineage traces monitoring fields from source systems to alert outputs
• Data-quality controls test completeness, accuracy, timeliness, consistency, and uniqueness
• Privacy requirements govern lawful access, sharing, retention, and secure disposal
• Management information reports risk trends, alert volumes, backlogs, and reporting outcomes
• Key risk indicators require thresholds, owners, trend analysis, and escalation actions

Participants can test AML/CFT control effectiveness and document remediation priorities.

• Quality assurance samples customer files, alerts, investigations, and report decisions
• Control testing evaluates design adequacy, operating effectiveness, and evidence quality
• Sampling methods use risk-based selection, random samples, and targeted populations
• Issue ratings consider regulatory impact, customer exposure, likelihood, and control failure
• Root-cause analysis identifies people, process, technology, data, and governance causes
• Remediation plans assign actions, owners, dates, validation, and closure evidence

Participants can manage regulatory findings, remediation plans and sustained control improvements.

• Regulatory findings require factual responses, accountable owners, and credible completion dates
• Lookback reviews define affected populations, review logic, documentation, and reporting
• Independent validation tests whether remediation addresses the original control weakness
• Regulatory communication records commitments, assumptions, milestones, and material deviations
• Programme roadmaps sequence urgent control fixes, data improvements, and capability building
• Management challenge tests progress reports against evidence, risks, and overdue actions

Participants can assemble implementation plans that embed AML/CFT responsibilities across functions.

• AML/CFT programme components: governance, risk assessment, controls, training, testing, reporting
• RACI matrices assign responsibility, accountability, consultation, and information responsibilities
• Training needs analysis differentiates front-line, operations, investigators, and board audiences
• Escalation protocols define urgent sanctions, suspicious activity, and customer-exit decisions
• Control inventories connect policies, procedures, systems, records, and accountable owners
• Implementation plans sequence dependencies, resources, milestones, acceptance criteria, and risks

Participants can build, review and present a complete risk-based AML/CFT programme pack.

• Enterprise risk assessment identifies priority exposures and residual-risk treatment decisions
• Customer-risk model defines scoring factors, thresholds, review cycles, and approvals
• Due-diligence checklist specifies evidence, beneficial ownership, screening, and escalation requirements
• Monitoring design documents scenarios, parameters, quality measures, and governance controls
• Investigation and reporting framework records triage, evidence, disposition, and SAR decisions
• Management presentation defends programme priorities, remediation actions, metrics, and accountability