Bowtie Risk Analysis Training Course

Participants can define hazards and top events with sufficient precision for analysis.

• Hazards defined as sources of potential harm or loss
• Top events framed as loss of control over hazards
• Energy-source examples: pressure, gravity, electricity, chemicals and movement
• Occupational health hazards including dust, noise, biological agents and ergonomics
• Scope boundaries set for tasks, locations, equipment and operating states
• Ambiguous top-event statements corrected through cause-and-effect testing

Participants can identify credible threats that could trigger a top event.

• Threat identification using task analysis, incident data and expert judgement
• Direct causes separated from underlying management-system weaknesses
• Fault-tree thinking used to test threat completeness and plausibility
• Credible initiating events selected without listing every possible variation
• Human, equipment, environmental and organisational threat sources compared
• Causal pathways documented without confusing threats with consequences

Participants can identify credible consequences following loss of control.

• Consequence pathways developed from the defined top event
• People, environment, assets, operations and reputation considered separately
• Severity descriptions calibrated using existing organisational risk criteria
• Immediate and delayed occupational health consequences distinguished clearly
• Emergency scenarios tested against credible exposure and release conditions
• Duplicate consequences consolidated while preserving meaningful risk distinctions

Participants can identify and classify barriers that prevent the top event.

• Preventive barriers matched directly to individual threat pathways
• Engineering controls assessed before administrative and behavioural controls
• Hierarchy of controls applied to barrier selection decisions
• Procedures recognised as barriers only when performance can be verified
• Competence, supervision and design controls tested for independence
• Barrier statements written as specific controls rather than broad intentions

Participants can identify controls that limit harm after a top event.

• Mitigative barriers linked to defined consequence pathways and exposure conditions
• Emergency shutdowns, alarms and containment evaluated as recovery controls
• First aid, rescue and medical response positioned appropriately
• Evacuation arrangements tested against credible release and access scenarios
• Personal protective equipment assessed as last-line protective control
• Recovery barriers distinguished from actions taken after harm occurs

Participants can test whether barriers are specific, effective and sufficiently independent.

• Barrier quality tested for effectiveness, availability, reliability and survivability
• Independence assessed where multiple controls share common failure causes
• Control duplication identified across procedures, permits and supervision arrangements
• Swiss Cheese Model used to explain layered-defence weaknesses
• Barrier functions separated from the systems supporting their performance
• Weak barriers strengthened through redesign, verification or additional controls

Participants can identify factors that degrade barriers and controls that manage degradation.

• Escalation factors identified as conditions that weaken barrier performance
• Maintenance backlog, fatigue and weather assessed as degradation sources
• Escalation controls linked to each relevant barrier degradation mechanism
• Barrier bypasses, overrides and impairments managed through formal controls
• Common-cause failures examined across preventive and mitigative barriers
• Degradation scenarios recorded within bowtie diagrams and barrier registers

Participants can determine critical controls and specify measurable performance requirements.

• Critical controls selected using consequence severity and control dependency
• Performance standards define required function, availability and response time
• Functional requirements translated into observable field verification criteria
• Design, operating and maintenance requirements separated within control standards
• Acceptance criteria written for permits, inspections and equipment safeguards
• Control owners assigned authority, competence and resource responsibilities

Participants can create assurance plans that verify critical-control performance.

• Assurance activities selected for preventive, mitigative and escalation-control barriers
• Inspection, testing, observation and document review methods compared
• Verification frequencies set according to risk, degradation and operating exposure
• Leading indicators defined for critical-control health and reliability
• Assurance records linked to accountable owners and escalation routes
• Sampling plans designed without substituting assurance for operational control

Participants can connect bowtie outputs with ISO 45001 operational control requirements.

• ISO 45001 clauses connected to bowtie risk-control outputs
• Hazard identification processes informed by bowtie threat and consequence logic
• Operational planning controls aligned with critical-control performance standards
• Management of change assessed against existing bowtie barrier assumptions
• Worker consultation used to validate task-level control realities
• Internal audit evidence mapped to barrier assurance and corrective action

Participants can select when bowtie analysis adds value alongside other risk methods.

• Bowties compared with JSA, HAZOP, What-If and FMEA methods
• Risk matrices used without replacing causal and barrier analysis
• IEC 31010 selection principles applied to assessment method choice
• HAZOP deviations converted into threats, top events and consequences
• Task risk assessments linked to site-level bowtie critical controls
• Risk registers structured around hazards, top events and assurance actions

Participants can represent human and organisational factors without weakening bowtie logic.

• Human factors integrated through realistic threat and barrier descriptions
• Competence requirements specified beyond attendance at safety training
• Workload, fatigue and communication failures examined as escalation factors
• Procedural usability assessed through task observation and workforce feedback
• Supervision barriers defined with clear triggers and intervention expectations
• Organisational learning controls linked to recurring incident patterns

Participants can apply bowties to risks shared between clients, contractors and operators.

• Interface hazards mapped across client, contractor and subcontractor responsibilities
• Control ownership assigned where work groups share operational boundaries
• Contractor competence evidence tested against critical-control requirements
• Permit-to-work interfaces represented as barriers with defined performance standards
• Handover failures assessed during shift changes and project transitions
• Assurance responsibilities coordinated across multiple duty holders

Participants can use bowties to analyse incident pathways and improve controls.

• Incident timelines mapped against threats, barriers and consequence pathways
• Failed, missing and degraded barriers classified using evidence
• Five Whys applied without stopping at individual worker actions
• TapRooT-style causal categories compared with bowtie barrier failures
• Corrective actions tested for barrier function, ownership and verification
• Lessons learned converted into revised performance standards and assurance plans

Participants can communicate bowtie findings to frontline teams and decision-makers.

• Bowtie diagrams simplified for frontline briefings without losing control logic
• Critical controls translated into clear field-verification questions
• Management reports distinguish barrier health from incident-rate performance
• Visual conventions used consistently for threats, barriers and consequences
• Risk communication tailored for operators, supervisors and executive leaders
• Challenge sessions structured to test assumptions and ownership

Participants can define information requirements for maintaining bowties in digital systems.

• Data fields specified for barriers, owners, standards and assurance evidence
• Version control applied when operational changes affect bowtie assumptions
• Barrier registers connected with inspection, maintenance and action-tracking systems
• Dashboards designed around overdue assurance, impairments and control health
• Data quality checks identify obsolete owners and unsupported control claims
• Access permissions protect approved diagrams while enabling workforce consultation

Participants can conduct structured quality reviews of bowtie analyses and barrier registers.

• Quality review criteria test scope, logic, completeness and traceability
• Independent reviewers challenge unsupported links between threats and barriers
• Barrier claims checked against procedures, drawings and field observations
• Consequence scenarios tested for credible escalation and emergency response
• Action registers prioritised by critical-control gaps and residual exposure
• Review findings documented with owners, deadlines and closure evidence

Participants can plan a practical bowtie implementation programme for their organisation.

• Implementation scope prioritised using serious-risk profiles and operational exposure
• Governance roles defined for authors, approvers, owners and reviewers
• Pilot bowties selected to demonstrate value before wider deployment
• Training plans distinguish awareness, verification and technical analysis roles
• Management review cadence established for barrier health and overdue actions
• Change-management steps maintain workforce involvement and operational ownership

Participants can build, review and present a complete bowtie analysis with critical-control assurance arrangements.

• Selected workplace hazard framed with clear scope and top event
• Threats, consequences and barriers assembled into a complete bowtie diagram
• Escalation factors and escalation controls tested against realistic conditions
• Critical-control performance standards drafted with accountable control owners
• Assurance plan prepared using verification activities, frequencies and evidence
• Peer review findings addressed before formal risk-control presentation